Consent to Create Binding: Difference between revisions
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Subject<blockquote>MANDITORY - this is the identifier from the user that will be the subject of the binding. It serves nearly the same purpose as the the DN of the X.509 certificate. Whether this subject identifier is to be bound to a real world entity (like a human being) is to be determined by the purposes to which the resulting entity statement will be put.</blockquote> | Subject<blockquote>MANDITORY - this is the identifier from the user that will be the subject of the binding. It serves nearly the same purpose as the the DN of the X.509 certificate. Whether this subject identifier is to be bound to a real world entity (like a human being) is to be determined by the purposes to which the resulting entity statement will be put.</blockquote> | ||
Issuer<blockquote>MANDITORY - URi OF the CSP (Audience of the request).</blockquote> | |||
Entity Statement<blockquote>NOT PART OF REQUEST - this is the message returned by the CSP after the process has been completed. It is then made available to any legitimate request. It is signed by a well-known key belonging the the CSP.</blockquote> | Entity Statement<blockquote>NOT PART OF REQUEST - this is the message returned by the CSP after the process has been completed. It is then made available to any legitimate request. It is signed by a well-known key belonging the the CSP.</blockquote> | ||
Device Statement<blockquote>MANDITORY for AAL2 and higher certifications. It is used by the CSP to verify the level of protection provided to the Private key of the certificate.</blockquote> | Device Statement<blockquote>MANDITORY for AAL2 and higher certifications. It is used by the CSP to verify the level of protection provided to the Private key of the certificate.</blockquote> | ||
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Issue Date<blockquote>MANDITORY - Linux epoch date is default</blockquote> | Issue Date<blockquote>MANDITORY - Linux epoch date is default</blockquote> | ||
Expiration Date<blockquote>MANDITORY - Linux epoch date is default</blockquote> | Expiration Date<blockquote>MANDITORY - Linux epoch date is default</blockquote> | ||
Subject<blockquote>MANDITORY</blockquote> | Subject Public Key<blockquote>MANDITORY - be be included directly or by reference.</blockquote> | ||
Signature<blockquote>MANDITORY - using the above key.</blockquote> | |||
Encryption<blockquote>MANDITORY??? - using the CSP key.</blockquote> |
Revision as of 21:07, 8 September 2019
Full Title
The definition of a message to carry consent from a subject to a Credential Service Provider.
Goals
The goal is a certificate in the hands of the user which meets the security requirements of the intended purpose.
Context
In an environment where a subject is requesting the establishment of a binding between it's private key and a Provider of any identifier services, the implicit assumption has been that the action of the subject on the website is sufficient. In today's world of gathering a subject's most private information some better means of capturing subject consent is urgently needed.
Existing Methods
- While it is true that methods exist for individual subjects to acquire a certificate for signing emails and receiving encrypted email, the adoption of that method outside of th enterprise is essentially failed and will not be considered as a paradigm for this effort.
- The most common request today is for an SSL or EV certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA) which works reasonably well for what it is intended to do. While it is possible to set up a CA of your own, we will address the more common case of a CA that has been approved by the major browser vendors. Before the process begins the user selects a Distinguished Name for the site based on the rules established by the CA/B forum.
NIST levels of Assurance
External Definitions used in this Document
Credential Service Provider
Problems
Prevention of attacks (exploits)
Solution
The following is the current understanding of what needs to be included in a Consent for Binding Request.
Subject
MANDITORY - this is the identifier from the user that will be the subject of the binding. It serves nearly the same purpose as the the DN of the X.509 certificate. Whether this subject identifier is to be bound to a real world entity (like a human being) is to be determined by the purposes to which the resulting entity statement will be put.
Issuer
MANDITORY - URi OF the CSP (Audience of the request).
Entity Statement
NOT PART OF REQUEST - this is the message returned by the CSP after the process has been completed. It is then made available to any legitimate request. It is signed by a well-known key belonging the the CSP.
Device Statement
MANDITORY for AAL2 and higher certifications. It is used by the CSP to verify the level of protection provided to the Private key of the certificate.
Identity Proof
MANDITORY unless the CSP is willing and able to provide it for the subject in IAL2 and higher assurance credentials.
Purpose
MANDATORY for any level of assurance greater than level one in any of the 3 categories of assurance.
ACR
OPTIONAL - this is only useful in the case where the Purpose is not adequate to establish the required levels of assurance of the resulting Entity Statement.
Issue Date
MANDITORY - Linux epoch date is default
Expiration Date
MANDITORY - Linux epoch date is default
Subject Public Key
MANDITORY - be be included directly or by reference.
Signature
MANDITORY - using the above key.
Encryption
MANDITORY??? - using the CSP key.